Expect-CT Extension for HTTPGoogleestark@google.com
Applications and Real-Time
HTTPCertificate TransparencyExpect-CTThis document defines a new HTTP header field named "Expect-CT", which
allows web host operators to instruct user agents (UAs) to expect valid
Signed Certificate Timestamps (SCTs) to be served on connections to
these hosts. Expect-CT allows web host operators to discover
misconfigurations in their Certificate Transparency (CT)
deployments. Further, web host operators can use Expect-CT to ensure
that if a UA that supports Expect-CT accepts a misissued certificate,
that certificate will be discoverable in Certificate Transparency
logs.Status of This Memo
This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is
published for examination, experimental implementation, and
evaluation.
This document defines an Experimental Protocol for the Internet
community. This document is a product of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community.
It has received public review and has been approved for publication
by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Not all documents
approved by the IESG are candidates for any level of Internet
Standard; see Section 2 of RFC 7841.
Information about the current status of this document, any
errata, and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
.
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Table of Contents
. Introduction
. Requirements Language
. Terminology
. Server and Client Behavior
. Response Header Field Syntax
. The report-uri Directive
. The enforce Directive
. The max-age Directive
. Examples
. Host Processing Model
. HTTP-over-Secure-Transport Request Type
. HTTP Request Type
. User Agent Processing Model
. Missing or Malformed Expect-CT Header Fields
. Expect-CT Header Field Processing
. Reporting
. Evaluating Expect-CT Connections for CT Compliance
. Skipping CT Compliance Checks
. Reporting Expect-CT Failure
. Generating a Violation Report
. Sending a Violation Report
. Receiving a Violation Report
. Usability Considerations
. Authoring Considerations
. Privacy Considerations
. Security Considerations
. Hostile Header Attacks
. Maximum max-age
. Amplification Attacks
. IANA Considerations
. Header Field Registry
. Media Types Registry
. References
. Normative References
. Informative References
Author's Address
IntroductionThis document defines a new HTTP header field () that enables UAs to
identify web hosts that expect the presence of Signed Certificate
Timestamps (SCTs) in
subsequent Transport Layer Security (TLS) connections.Web hosts that serve the Expect-CT header field are noted by the
UA as "Known Expect-CT Hosts". The UA evaluates each connection to a Known
Expect-CT Host for compliance with the UA's Certificate Transparency
(CT) Policy. If the connection violates the CT Policy, the UA sends a
report to a URI configured by the Expect-CT Host and/or fails the
connection, depending on the configuration that the Expect-CT Host has
chosen.If misconfigured, Expect-CT can cause unwanted connection failures
(for example, if a host deploys Expect-CT but then switches to a
legitimate certificate that is not logged in Certificate Transparency
logs or if a web host operator believes their certificate to conform to
all UAs' CT policies but is mistaken). Web host operators are advised to
deploy Expect-CT with precautions by using the reporting feature and
gradually increasing the time interval during which the UA regards the
host as a Known Expect-CT Host. These precautions can help web host
operators gain confidence that their Expect-CT deployment is not causing
unwanted connection failures.Expect-CT is a trust-on-first-use (TOFU) mechanism. The first time a
UA connects to a host, it lacks the information necessary to require
SCTs for the connection. Thus, the UA will not be able to detect and
thwart an attack on the UA's first connection to the host. Still,
Expect-CT provides value by 1) allowing UAs to detect the use of
unlogged certificates after the initial communication, and 2) allowing
web hosts to be confident that UAs are only trusting publicly auditable
certificates.Expect-CT is similar to HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS) and HTTP Public Key Pinning (HPKP)
. HSTS allows websites to
declare themselves accessible only via secure connections, and HPKP
allows websites to declare their cryptographic identifies. Similarly,
Expect-CT allows websites to declare themselves accessible only via
connections that are compliant with CT Policy.This Expect-CT specification is compatible with and , but not necessarily with future versions of Certificate
Transparency.
UAs will ignore Expect-CT header fields from web hosts that use future
versions of Certificate Transparency, unless a future version of this
document specifies how they should be processed.
Requirements LanguageThe key words "MUST", "MUST NOT",
"REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT",
"RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED",
"MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document
are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 when, and
only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.TerminologyTerminology is defined in this section.
"Certificate Transparency Policy"
A policy defined by the UA concerning the number, sources, and delivery
mechanisms of Signed Certificate Timestamps that are associated with TLS
connections. The policy defines the properties of a connection that must be
met in order for the UA to consider it CT qualified.
"Certificate Transparency Qualified"
Describes a TLS connection for which the UA has determined that a
sufficient quantity and quality of Signed Certificate Timestamps have been provided.
"CT Qualified"
An abbreviation for "Certificate Transparency Qualified".
"CT Policy"
An abbreviation for "Certificate Transparency Policy".
"Effective Expect-CT Date"
The time at which a UA observed a valid Expect-CT header field for a given host.
"Expect-CT Host"
A conformant host implementing the HTTP server aspects of Expect-CT. This
means that an Expect-CT Host returns the Expect-CT response header
field in its HTTP response messages sent over secure transport. The term
"host" is equivalent to "server" in this specification.
"Known Expect-CT Host"
An Expect-CT Host that the UA has noted as such. See for particulars.
"User Agent (UA)"
For the purposes of this specification, a UA is an HTTP client application
typically actively manipulated by a user .
"Unknown Expect-CT Host"
An Expect-CT Host that the UA has not noted.
Server and Client BehaviorResponse Header Field SyntaxThe Expect-CT response header field is a new field defined in
this specification. It is used by a server to indicate that UAs should
evaluate connections to the host emitting the header field for CT
compliance (). describes the
syntax (Augmented Backus-Naur Form) of the header field, using the
grammar defined in and the
rules defined in . The "#" ABNF extension is specified in .The directives defined in this specification are described below. The overall
requirements for directives are:
The order of appearance of directives is not significant.
A given directive MUST NOT appear more than once in a given header
field. Directives are either optional or required, as stipulated in their
definitions.
Directive names are case insensitive.
UAs MUST ignore any header fields containing
directives, or other header field value data that does not conform to
the syntax defined in this specification. In particular, UAs
MUST NOT attempt to fix malformed header fields.
If a header field contains any directive(s) the UA does not
recognize, the UA MUST ignore those directives.
If the Expect-CT header field otherwise satisfies the above
requirements (1 through 5), and Expect-CT is not disabled for local
policy reasons (as discussed in ), the UA
MUST process the directives it recognizes.
The report-uri DirectiveThe OPTIONALreport-uri directive
indicates the URI to which the UA SHOULD report
Expect-CT failures (). The UA POSTs the reports to the given URI as
described in .The report-uri directive is REQUIRED to
have a directive value, for which the syntax is defined in .The 'report-uri-value' MUST be quoted if it contains any
character not allowed in 'token'.
absolute-URI is defined in .UAs MUST ignore any report-uri that does
not use the HTTPS scheme. UAs MUST check Expect-CT
compliance when the host in the report-uri is a Known
Expect-CT Host; similarly, UAs MUST apply HSTS if the host in the
report-uri is a Known HSTS Host.UAs SHOULD make their best effort to report
Expect-CT failures to the report-uri, but they may fail to
report in exceptional conditions. For example, if connecting to the
report-uri itself incurs an Expect-CT failure or other
certificate validation failure, the UA MUST cancel
the connection. Similarly, if Expect-CT Host A sets a
report-uri referring to Expect-CT Host B, and if B sets a
report-uri referring to A, and if both hosts fail to comply
to the UA's CT Policy, the UA SHOULD detect and break
the loop by failing to send reports to and about those hosts.Note that the report-uri need not necessarily be in the same
Internet domain or web origin as the host being reported
about. Hosts are in fact encouraged to use a separate host as the
report-uri so that CT failures on the Expect-CT Host do not prevent
reports from being sent.UAs SHOULD limit the rate at which they send reports. For example, it is
unnecessary to send the same report to the same report-uri more than once in
the same web-browsing session.The enforce DirectiveThe OPTIONALenforce directive is a valueless directive that, if present
(i.e., it is "asserted"), signals to the UA that compliance to the CT Policy
should be enforced (rather than report-only) and that the UA should refuse
future connections that violate its CT Policy. When both the enforce directive
and report-uri directive (as defined in ) are present, the
configuration is referred to as an "enforce-and-report" configuration,
signaling to the UA that both compliance to the CT Policy should be enforced
and violations should be reported.The max-age DirectiveThe max-age directive specifies the number of seconds after the reception of
the Expect-CT header field during which the UA SHOULD regard the host from whom
the message was received as a Known Expect-CT Host.If a response contains an Expect-CT header field, then the response MUST
contain an Expect-CT header field with a max-age directive. (A max-age
directive need not appear in every Expect-CT header field in the response.)
The max-age directive is REQUIRED to have a directive value, for which the
syntax (after quoted-string unescaping, if necessary) is defined in
.delta-seconds is used as defined in .ExamplesThe following three examples demonstrate valid Expect-CT response header fields
(where the second splits the directives into two field instances):Host Processing ModelThis section describes the processing model that Expect-CT Hosts implement. The
model has 2 parts: (1) the processing rules for HTTP request messages received
over a secure transport (e.g., authenticated, non-anonymous TLS); and (2) the
processing rules for HTTP request messages received over non-secure transports,
such as TCP.HTTP-over-Secure-Transport Request TypeAn Expect-CT Host includes an Expect-CT header field in its response. The header
field MUST satisfy the grammar specified in .Establishing a given host as an Expect-CT Host, in the context of a given UA,
is accomplished as follows:
Over the HTTP protocol running over secure transport, by correctly returning
(per this specification) a valid Expect-CT header field to the UA.
Through other mechanisms such as a client-side preloaded Expect-CT Host
list.
HTTP Request TypeExpect-CT Hosts SHOULD NOT include the Expect-CT header field in HTTP responses
conveyed over non-secure transport.User Agent Processing ModelThe UA processing model relies on parsing domain names. Note that
internationalized domain names SHALL be canonicalized by the UA according to the
scheme in .The UA stores Known Expect-CT Hosts and their associated Expect-CT
directives. This data is collectively known as a host's "Expect-CT metadata".Missing or Malformed Expect-CT Header FieldsIf an HTTP response does not include an Expect-CT header field that conforms to
the grammar specified in , then the UA MUST NOT
update any Expect-CT metadata.Expect-CT Header Field ProcessingIf the UA receives an HTTP response over a secure transport that includes an
Expect-CT header field conforming to the grammar specified in
, the UA MUST evaluate the connection on which
the header field was received for compliance with the UA's CT Policy, and then
process the Expect-CT header field as follows. UAs MUST ignore any Expect-CT
header field received in an HTTP response conveyed over non-secure transport.If the connection does not comply with the UA's CT Policy (i.e., the connection
is not CT qualified), then the UA MUST NOT update any Expect-CT metadata. If the
header field includes a report-uri directive, the UA SHOULD send a report to
the specified report-uri ().If the connection complies with the UA's CT Policy (i.e., the
connection is CT qualified), then the UA MUST
either:
Note the host as a Known Expect-CT Host if it is not already so noted (see
) or
Update the UA's cached information for the Known Expect-CT
Host if the enforce, max-age, or
report-uri header field value directives convey
information different from that already maintained by the UA. If
the max-age directive has a value of 0, the UA
MUST remove its cached Expect-CT information if the
host was previously noted as a Known Expect-CT Host and
MUST NOT note this host as a Known Expect-CT Host
if it is not already noted.
If a UA receives an Expect-CT header field over a CT-compliant
connection that uses a version of Certificate Transparency other
than or , the UA MUST
ignore the Expect-CT header field and clear any Expect-CT metadata
associated with the host.Noting Expect-CTUpon receipt of the Expect-CT response header field over an error-free TLS
connection (with X.509 certificate chain validation as described in
, as well as the validation described in of this document),
the UA MUST note the host as a Known Expect-CT Host, storing the host's domain
name and its associated Expect-CT directives in non-volatile storage.To note a host as a Known Expect-CT Host, the UA
MUST set its Expect-CT metadata in its Known
Expect-CT Host cache (as specified in ), using the metadata given in the most recently
received valid Expect-CT header field.For forward compatibility, the UA MUST ignore any unrecognized Expect-CT header
field directives while still processing those directives it does
recognize. specifies the directives enforce,
max-age, and report-uri, but future specifications and implementations might
use additional directives.Storage ModelIf the substring matching the host production from the Request-URI (of the
message to which the host responded) does not exactly match an existing Known
Expect-CT Host's domain name, per the matching procedure for a Congruent Match
specified in , then the UA MUST add this host to the
Known Expect-CT Host cache. The UA caches:
the Expect-CT Host's domain name.
whether the enforce directive is present.
the Effective Expiration Date, which is the Effective
Expect-CT Date plus the value of the max-age
directive. Alternatively, the UA MAY cache enough
information to calculate the Effective Expiration Date. The
Effective Expiration Date is calculated from when the UA
observed the Expect-CT header field and is independent of when
the response was generated.
the value of the report-uri directive, if present.
If any other metadata from optional or future Expect-CT header
directives are present in the Expect-CT header field, and the UA
understands them, the UA MAY note them as well.UAs MAY set an upper limit on the value of
max-age so that UAs that have noted erroneous Expect-CT Hosts
(whether by accident or due to attack) have some chance of
recovering over time. If the server sets a max-age greater than
the UA's upper limit, the UA may behave as if the server set the
max-age to the UA's upper limit. For example, if the UA caps
max-age at 5,184,000 seconds (60 days), and an Expect-CT Host sets
a max-age directive of 90 days in its Expect-CT header field, the
UA may behave as if the max-age were effectively 60 days. (One way
to achieve this behavior is for the UA to simply store a value of
60 days instead of the 90-day value provided by the Expect-CT
Host.)ReportingIf the UA receives, over a secure transport, an HTTP response that includes an
Expect-CT header field with a report-uri directive, and the connection does
not comply with the UA's CT Policy (i.e., the connection is not CT qualified),
and the UA has not already sent an Expect-CT report for this connection, then
the UA SHOULD send a report to the specified report-uri as specified in
.Evaluating Expect-CT Connections for CT ComplianceWhen a UA sets up a TLS connection, the UA determines whether the
host is a Known Expect-CT Host according to its Known Expect-CT Host
cache. An Expect-CT Host is "expired" if the Effective Expiration Date
refers to a date in the past. The UA MUST ignore any
expired Expect-CT Hosts in its cache and not treat such hosts as Known
Expect-CT Hosts.When a UA connects to a Known Expect-CT Host using a TLS
connection, if the TLS connection has no errors, then the UA will
apply an additional correctness check: compliance with a CT Policy. A
UA should evaluate compliance with its CT Policy whenever connecting
to a Known Expect-CT Host. However, the check can be skipped for local
policy reasons (as discussed in ) or in the
event that other checks cause the UA to terminate the connection
before CT compliance is evaluated. For example, a Public Key Pinning
failure could cause the UA
to terminate the connection before CT compliance is
checked. Similarly, if the UA terminates the connection due to an
Expect-CT failure, this could cause the UA to skip subsequent
correctness checks. When the CT compliance check is skipped or
bypassed, Expect-CT reports () will not be
sent.When CT compliance is evaluated for a Known Expect-CT Host, the UA
MUST evaluate compliance when setting up the TLS
session, before beginning an HTTP conversation over the TLS
channel.If a connection to a Known Expect-CT Host violates the UA's CT
Policy (i.e., the connection is not CT qualified), and if the Known
Expect-CT Host's Expect-CT metadata indicates an enforce
configuration, the UA MUST treat the CT compliance
failure as an error. The UA MAY allow the user to
bypass the error unless connection errors should have no user recourse
due to other policies in effect (such as HSTS, as described in ).If a connection to a Known Expect-CT Host violates the UA's CT
Policy, and if the Known Expect-CT Host's Expect-CT metadata includes
a report-uri, the UA SHOULD send an Expect-CT
report to that report-uri ().Skipping CT Compliance ChecksIt is acceptable for a UA to skip CT compliance checks for some
hosts according to local policy. For example, a UA
MAY disable CT compliance checks for hosts whose
validated certificate chain terminates at a user-defined trust
anchor rather than a trust anchor built in to the UA (or underlying
platform).If the UA does not evaluate CT compliance, e.g., because the user
has elected to disable it, or because a presented certificate chain
chains up to a user-defined trust anchor, UAs SHOULD NOT send Expect-CT reports.Reporting Expect-CT FailureWhen the UA attempts to connect to a Known Expect-CT Host and the
connection is not CT qualified, the UA SHOULD report
Expect-CT failures to the report-uri, if any, in the Known
Expect-CT Host's Expect-CT metadata.When the UA receives an Expect-CT response header field over a connection that
is not CT qualified, if the UA has not already sent an Expect-CT report for this
connection, then the UA SHOULD report Expect-CT failures to the configured
report-uri, if any.Generating a Violation ReportTo generate a violation report object, the UA constructs a JSON
object with the following
keys and values:
"date-time"
The value for this key indicates the UTC
time that the UA observed the CT compliance failure. The value is a
string formatted according to , "Internet Date/Time Format".
"hostname"
The value is the hostname to which the UA
made the original request that failed the CT compliance check. The
value is provided as a string.
"port"
The value is the port to which the UA made the
original request that failed the CT compliance check. The value is
provided as an integer.
"scheme"
(optional) The value is the scheme with which
the UA made the original request that failed the CT compliance
check. The value is provided as a string. This key is optional and
is assumed to be "https" if not present.
"effective-expiration-date"
The value indicates the
Effective Expiration Date (see ) for the Expect-CT Host that failed the CT
compliance check, in UTC. The value is provided as a string
formatted according to , "Internet Date/Time Format".
"served-certificate-chain"
The value is the
certificate chain as served by the Expect-CT Host during TLS session
setup. The value is provided as an array of strings, which
MUST appear in the order that the certificates were
served; each string in the array is the Privacy-Enhanced Mail (PEM)
representation of each X.509 certificate as described in .
"validated-certificate-chain"
The value is the certificate chain
as constructed by the UA during certificate chain verification. (This may
differ from the value of the "served-certificate-chain" key.) The value is
provided as an array of strings, which MUST appear in the order
matching the chain that the UA validated; each string in the array is the
PEM representation of each X.509 certificate as
described in . The first certificate
in the chain represents the end-entity certificate being verified. UAs that
build certificate chains in more than one way during the validation process
SHOULD send the last chain built.
"scts"
The value represents the SCTs (if any) that the UA received for the
Expect-CT Host and their validation statuses. The value is provided as an array
of JSON objects. The SCTs may appear in any order. Each JSON object in the array
has the following keys:
A "version" key, with an integer value. The UA MUST set
this value to 1 if the SCT is in the format defined in or 2 if it is
in the format defined in .
The "status" key, with a string value that the UA MUST
set to one of the following values: "unknown" (indicating that the UA does
not have or does not trust the public key of the log from which the SCT was
issued); "valid" (indicating that the UA successfully validated the SCT as
described in or
); or "invalid"
(indicating that the SCT validation failed because of a bad signature or an
invalid timestamp).
The "source" key, with a string value that indicates from where the UA
obtained the SCT, as defined in and . The UA MUST set the value to one of
the following: "tls-extension", "ocsp", or "embedded". These correspond to the three
methods of delivering SCTs in the TLS handshake that are described in .
The "serialized_sct" key, with a string value. If the value of the
"version" key is 1, the UA MUST set this value to
the base64-encoded serialized
SignedCertificateTimestamp structure from . The base64 encoding is defined in . If the value of the
"version" key is 2, the UA MUST set this value to
the base64-encoded serialized
TransItem structure representing the SCT, as defined in .
"failure-mode"
The value indicates whether the Expect-CT
report was triggered by an Expect-CT policy in enforce or
report-only mode. The value is provided as a string. The UA
MUST set this value to "enforce" if the Expect-CT
metadata indicates an enforce configuration, and
"report-only" otherwise.
"test-report"
(optional) The value is set to true if the report is
being sent by a testing client to verify that the report server
behaves correctly. The value is provided as a boolean and
MUST be set to true if the report serves to test the
server's behavior and can be discarded.
Sending a Violation ReportThe UA SHOULD report Expect-CT failures for Known
Expect-CT Hosts: that is, when a connection to a Known Expect-CT Host
does not comply with the UA's CT Policy and the host's Expect-CT
metadata contains a report-uri.Additionally, the UA SHOULD report Expect-CT
failures for hosts for which it does not have any stored Expect-CT
metadata; that is, when the UA connects to a host and receives an
Expect-CT header field that contains the report-uri
directive, the UA SHOULD report an Expect-CT failure if
the connection does not comply with the UA's CT Policy.The steps to report an Expect-CT failure are as follows.
Prepare a JSON object report object with the single key
"expect-ct-report", whose value is the result of generating a
violation report object as described in .
Let report body be the JSON stringification of report object.
Let report-uri be the value of the report-uri directive in the Expect-CT
header field.
Send an HTTP POST request to report-uri with a
Content-Type header field of
application/expect-ct-report+json and an entity body
consisting of report body.
The UA MAY perform other operations as part of
sending the HTTP POST request, such as sending a Cross-Origin
Resource Sharing (CORS) preflight as part of .Future versions of this specification may need to modify or extend
the Expect-CT report format. They may do so by defining a new
top-level key to contain the report, replacing the "expect-ct-report"
key. defines how
report servers should handle report formats that they do not
support.Receiving a Violation ReportUpon receiving an Expect-CT violation report, the report server
MUST respond with a 2xx (Successful) status code if it
can parse the request body as valid JSON, the report conforms to the
format described in , and it recognizes the scheme, hostname, and port
in the "scheme", "hostname", and "port" fields of the report. If the
report body cannot be parsed or does not conform to the
format described in , or the report server does not expect to receive
reports for the scheme, hostname, or port in the report, then the
report server MUST respond with a 400 Bad Request
status code.As described in ,
future versions of this specification may define new report formats
that are sent with a different top-level key. If the report server
does not recognize the report format, the report server
MUST respond with a 501 Not Implemented status
code.If the report's "test-report" key is set to true, the server MAY discard the
report without further processing but MUST still return a 2xx (Successful)
status code. If the "test-report" key is absent or set to false, the server
SHOULD store the report for processing and analysis by the owner of the
Expect-CT Host.Usability ConsiderationsWhen the UA detects a Known Expect-CT Host in violation of the UA's CT Policy,
end users will experience denials of service. It is advisable for UAs to explain
to users why they cannot access the Expect-CT Host, e.g., in a user interface
that explains that the host's certificate cannot be validated.Authoring ConsiderationsExpect-CT could be specified as a TLS extension or X.509 certificate
extension instead of an HTTP response header field. Using an HTTP header
field as the mechanism for Expect-CT introduces a layering mismatch; for
example, the software that terminates TLS and validates Certificate
Transparency information might know nothing about HTTP. Nevertheless, an
HTTP header field was chosen primarily for ease of deployment. In
practice, deploying new certificate extensions requires certificate
authorities to support them, and new TLS extensions require server
software updates, including possibly to servers outside of the site
owner's direct control (such as in the case of a third-party Content
Delivery Network (CDN)). Ease
of deployment is a high priority for Expect-CT because it is intended as
a temporary transition mechanism for user agents that are transitioning
to universal Certificate Transparency requirements.Privacy ConsiderationsExpect-CT can be used to infer what Certificate Transparency Policy a
UA is using by attempting to retrieve specially configured websites
that pass one user agent's policies but not another's. Note that this
consideration is true of UAs that enforce CT policies without Expect-CT
as well.Additionally, reports submitted to the report-uri could
reveal information to a third party about which web page is being
accessed and by which IP address, by using individual
report-uri values for individually tracked pages. This
information could be leaked even if client-side scripting were
disabled.Implementations store state about Known Expect-CT Hosts and, hence,
which domains the UA has contacted. Implementations may choose to not
store this state subject to local policy (e.g., in the private browsing
mode of a web browser).Violation reports, as noted in , contain
information about the certificate chain that has violated the CT Policy. In some
cases, such as an organization-wide compromise of the end-to-end security of TLS,
this may include information about the interception tools and design used by the
organization that the organization would otherwise prefer not be disclosed.Because Expect-CT causes remotely detectable behavior, it's advisable
that UAs offer a way for privacy-sensitive end users to clear currently
noted Expect-CT Hosts and allow users to query the current state of
Known Expect-CT Hosts.Security ConsiderationsHostile Header AttacksWhen UAs support the Expect-CT header field, it becomes a potential
vector for hostile header attacks against site owners. If a site owner
uses a certificate issued by a certificate authority that does not
embed SCTs nor serve SCTs via the Online Certificate Status Protocol
(OCSP) or TLS extension, a malicious server operator or attacker could
temporarily reconfigure the host to comply with the UA's CT Policy
and add the Expect-CT header field in enforcing mode with a long
max-age. Implementing user agents would note this as an
Expect-CT Host (see ). After having done this, the configuration could
then be reverted to not comply with the CT Policy, prompting
failures. Note that this scenario would require the attacker to have
substantial control over the infrastructure in question, being able to
obtain different certificates, change server software, or act as a
man in the middle in connections. Site operators can mitigate this situation by one of the following:
reconfiguring their web server to transmit SCTs using the TLS
extension defined in ; obtaining a certificate from an alternative
certificate authority that provides SCTs by one of the other methods;
or by waiting for the user agent's persisted notation of this as an
Expect-CT Host to reach its max-age. User agents may choose
to implement mechanisms for users to cure this situation, as noted in
.Maximum max-ageThere is a security trade-off in that low maximum values provide a
narrow window of protection for users that visit the Known Expect-CT
Host only infrequently, while high maximum values might result in a
denial of service to a UA in the event of a hostile header attack or
simply an error on the part of the site owner.There is probably no ideal maximum for the max-age
directive. Since Expect-CT is primarily a policy-expansion and
investigation technology rather than an end-user protection, a value
on the order of 30 days (2,592,000 seconds) may be considered a
balance between these competing security concerns.Amplification AttacksAnother kind of hostile header attack uses the report-uri mechanism on many
hosts not currently exposing SCTs as a method to cause a denial of service to
the host receiving the reports. If some highly trafficked websites emitted
a non-enforcing Expect-CT header field with a report-uri, implementing UAs' reports
could flood the reporting host. It is noted in that UAs
should limit the rate at which they emit reports, but an attacker may alter the
Expect-CT header fields to induce UAs to submit different reports to different
URIs to still cause the same effect.IANA ConsiderationsHeader Field RegistryThis document registers the "Expect-CT" header field in the
"Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Field Name Registry" registry
located at .
Header field name:
Expect-CT
Applicable protocol:
http
Status:
permanent
Author/Change controller:
IETF
Specification document(s):
This document
Related information:
(empty)
Media Types RegistryThis document registers the application/expect-ct-report+json media type (which uses the suffix established in ) for Expect-CT violation reports in the "Media Types" registry as follows.
Type name:
application
Subtype name:
expect-ct-report+json
Required parameters:
n/a
Optional parameters:
n/a
Encoding considerations:
binary
Security considerations:
See
Interoperability considerations:
n/a
Published specification:
This document
Applications that use this media type:
UAs that implement Certificate Transparency compliance checks and reporting
Additional information:
Deprecated alias names for this type: n/a
Magic number(s): n/a
File extension(s): n/a
Macintosh file type code(s): n/a
Person & email address to contact for further information:
Emily Stark (estark@google.com)
Intended usage:
COMMON
Restrictions on usage:
none
Author:
Emily Stark (estark@google.com)
Change controller:
IETF
ReferencesNormative ReferencesKey words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement LevelsIn many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.Date and Time on the Internet: TimestampsThis document defines a date and time format for use in Internet protocols that is a profile of the ISO 8601 standard for representation of dates and times using the Gregorian calendar.Uniform Resource Identifier (URI): Generic SyntaxA Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) is a compact sequence of characters that identifies an abstract or physical resource. This specification defines the generic URI syntax and a process for resolving URI references that might be in relative form, along with guidelines and security considerations for the use of URIs on the Internet. The URI syntax defines a grammar that is a superset of all valid URIs, allowing an implementation to parse the common components of a URI reference without knowing the scheme-specific requirements of every possible identifier. This specification does not define a generative grammar for URIs; that task is performed by the individual specifications of each URI scheme. [STANDARDS-TRACK]The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data EncodingsThis document describes the commonly used base 64, base 32, and base 16 encoding schemes. It also discusses the use of line-feeds in encoded data, use of padding in encoded data, use of non-alphabet characters in encoded data, use of different encoding alphabets, and canonical encodings. [STANDARDS-TRACK]Augmented BNF for Syntax Specifications: ABNFInternet technical specifications often need to define a formal syntax. Over the years, a modified version of Backus-Naur Form (BNF), called Augmented BNF (ABNF), has been popular among many Internet specifications. The current specification documents ABNF. It balances compactness and simplicity with reasonable representational power. The differences between standard BNF and ABNF involve naming rules, repetition, alternatives, order-independence, and value ranges. This specification also supplies additional rule definitions and encoding for a core lexical analyzer of the type common to several Internet specifications. [STANDARDS-TRACK]Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) ProfileThis memo profiles the X.509 v3 certificate and X.509 v2 certificate revocation list (CRL) for use in the Internet. An overview of this approach and model is provided as an introduction. The X.509 v3 certificate format is described in detail, with additional information regarding the format and semantics of Internet name forms. Standard certificate extensions are described and two Internet-specific extensions are defined. A set of required certificate extensions is specified. The X.509 v2 CRL format is described in detail along with standard and Internet-specific extensions. An algorithm for X.509 certification path validation is described. An ASN.1 module and examples are provided in the appendices. [STANDARDS-TRACK]HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS)This specification defines a mechanism enabling web sites to declare themselves accessible only via secure connections and/or for users to be able to direct their user agent(s) to interact with given sites only over secure connections. This overall policy is referred to as HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS). The policy is declared by web sites via the Strict-Transport-Security HTTP response header field and/or by other means, such as user agent configuration, for example. [STANDARDS-TRACK]Additional Media Type Structured Syntax SuffixesA content media type name sometimes includes partitioned meta- information distinguished by a structured syntax to permit noting an attribute of the media as a suffix to the name. This document defines several structured syntax suffixes for use with media type registrations. In particular, it defines and registers the "+json", "+ber", "+der", "+fastinfoset", "+wbxml" and "+zip" structured syntax suffixes, and provides a media type structured syntax suffix registration form for the "+xml" structured syntax suffix. This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is published for informational purposes.Certificate TransparencyThis document describes an experimental protocol for publicly logging the existence of Transport Layer Security (TLS) certificates as they are issued or observed, in a manner that allows anyone to audit certificate authority (CA) activity and notice the issuance of suspect certificates as well as to audit the certificate logs themselves. The intent is that eventually clients would refuse to honor certificates that do not appear in a log, effectively forcing CAs to add all issued certificates to the logs.Logs are network services that implement the protocol operations for submissions and queries that are defined in this document.Textual Encodings of PKIX, PKCS, and CMS StructuresThis document describes and discusses the textual encodings of the Public-Key Infrastructure X.509 (PKIX), Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS), and Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS). The textual encodings are well-known, are implemented by several applications and libraries, and are widely deployed. This document articulates the de facto rules by which existing implementations operate and defines them so that future implementations can interoperate.Public Key Pinning Extension for HTTPThis document defines a new HTTP header that allows web host operators to instruct user agents to remember ("pin") the hosts' cryptographic identities over a period of time. During that time, user agents (UAs) will require that the host presents a certificate chain including at least one Subject Public Key Info structure whose fingerprint matches one of the pinned fingerprints for that host. By effectively reducing the number of trusted authorities who can authenticate the domain during the lifetime of the pin, pinning may reduce the incidence of man-in-the-middle attacks due to compromised Certification Authorities.Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key WordsRFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings.The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data Interchange FormatJavaScript Object Notation (JSON) is a lightweight, text-based, language-independent data interchange format. It was derived from the ECMAScript Programming Language Standard. JSON defines a small set of formatting rules for the portable representation of structured data.This document removes inconsistencies with other specifications of JSON, repairs specification errors, and offers experience-based interoperability guidance.HTTP SemanticsHTTP CachingCertificate Transparency Version 2.0This document describes version 2.0 of the Certificate Transparency (CT) protocol for publicly logging the existence of Transport Layer Security (TLS) server certificates as they are issued or observed, in a manner that allows anyone to audit certification authority (CA) activity and notice the issuance of suspect certificates as well as to audit the certificate logs themselves. The intent is that eventually clients would refuse to honor certificates that do not appear in a log, effectively forcing CAs to add all issued certificates to the logs.This document obsoletes RFC 6962. It also specifies a new TLS extension that is used to send various CT log artifacts.Logs are network services that implement the protocol operations for submissions and queries that are defined in this document.Informative ReferencesFetch - Living StandardWHATWGThe Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3This document specifies version 1.3 of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. TLS allows client/server applications to communicate over the Internet in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, and message forgery.This document updates RFCs 5705 and 6066, and obsoletes RFCs 5077, 5246, and 6961. This document also specifies new requirements for TLS 1.2 implementations.Author's AddressGoogleestark@google.com