Documentation

Do not attempt PKESK decryption; fall through to manual session-key input via the passphrase callback instead.

Resolve secret keys from a SecretKeyring. Only unencrypted secret keys (not passphrase-protected) are used. For passphrase-protected keys, use DecryptWithKeyringAndPassphrase.

Resolve secret keys from a SecretKeyring, unlocking passphrase- protected keys using the provided callback. The callback receives the public key payload and returns the passphrase, or Nothing to skip.

Preferred callback form for non-keyring key material. The callback receives a typed key identifier (8-octet key ID, fingerprint, or wildcard) plus the packet public-key algorithm, then returns all matching candidates in priority order. hOpenPGP iterates candidates deterministically without re-calling the callback for each retry.

The integrity-terminating marker (MDC or SEIPD v2 final AEAD tag) was seen and no further packets arrived. The message was well-formed end-to-end.

The input stream ended before any integrity-terminating marker was seen. The ciphertext was incomplete.

An integrity-terminating marker was seen, but additional packets followed it. Only possible with lenientDecryptPolicy (strict policy reports DecryptMalformedStructure instead). The trailing packets were forwarded downstream unchanged.

A structural packet-sequencing violation was detected. The String describes the specific violation:

• PKESK version does not match the SEIPD version (e.g. a v6 PKESK preceding a SEIPDv1 payload, or a v4 SKESK preceding a SEIPDv2 payload).
• ESK packets arrived in the wrong order relative to the encrypted data packet (e.g. a literal-data packet appeared between a PKESK and the SEIPD it was intended to protect).
• A packet arrived after the message integrity boundary (trailing data). Under defaultDecryptPolicy this is reported here; under lenientDecryptPolicy it is reported as DecryptTrailingData instead.